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Abstract 
This paper examines temporary trade barrier (TTB) implementation by 13 Latin American 
economies on a bilateral basis from 2000-2009 considering market power and import shocks. 
Additionally, we augment our analysis by including the effect of the presence or absence of tariff 
water on TTB implementation. We find evidence that market power and tariff water play an 
integral role in TTB implementation while import shocks do not. Using a probit model we estimate 
that a one standard deviation increase in market power and the absence of tariff water indicator 
increase the probability that a country imposes an antidumping tariff by 71 and 20 percent 
respectively, evaluated at their means. Interestingly, we do not find that import shocks have a 
significant impact on TTB implementation.  
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
From the 1950s to present international trade has been liberalized on many levels1. During 
the 1995 Uruguay Round of multilateral negotiations the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) was transformed into the World Trade Organization (WTO). At this juncture 112 new 
WTO members took further steps to liberalize international trade by decreasing their most-
favored-nation (MFN) tariffs and by forming preferential trade agreements. Yet, even as many 
barriers to trade were continuing to be eliminated or reduced—especially tariff levels among 
developed countries—there remain two protectionist trade policy avenues available to developing 
economies. 
The first, “temporary trade barriers” (TTBs), have emerged as new and significant 
obstacles to free trade, especially over the last 30 years. TTBs most notably consist of antidumping 
(AD) tariffs but may also appear in the form of safeguard (SG) tariffs and countervailing duties 
(CVs). In the 1980s TTB’s were a protectionist tool primarily employed by four industrialized 
nations, the U.S., EU, Canada and Australia (Knetter and Prusa 2003). However since the creation 
of the WTO in 1995 the use of TTBs among developing countries has drastically augmented.  
Bown (2011) estimates that in the mid-1990s approximately 0 percent of imported products in 
developing countries were subject to TTBs but by the late 2000s up to 3 percent of products were 
subject to TTBs in major emerging countries such as Argentina and Brazil. Finger, NG and 
Wangchuk (2001) posit that this precipitous rise in TTB use is non-coincidentally aligned with 
open trade policy because TTBs serve as a “pressure valve” necessary for importing governments 
to offer occasional sector-specific protection as demanded by myriad political economy and 
                                               
1 The GATT and WTO have had eight successful rounds of negotiation. Beginning with 23 countries at the Geneva 
Convention in 1947 to the latest Doha round which began in 2001 and is ongoing. Currently there are 162 members 
and observers of the WTO. 
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macro-economic factors.  Thus, these two competing phenomena, of broad trade liberalization and 
the subsequent rise of TTBs, creates a dichotomous institutional framework leading to many 
important research questions.  
The second prevailing avenue of economic trade protection is principally only at the 
disposal of developing economies and is a direct function of WTO policies. WTO members do not 
directly set precise tariff levels, rather they negotiate legal upper-bound limits over which any 
tariff set will be in violation of the WTO policy. The difference between the applied most favored 
nation (MFN) tariff and the bound tariff is known as tariff water. In principle, tariff water provides 
flexibility for governments to protect domestic industries against negative trade shocks by simply 
exercising their market power in the international market, or to respond to domestic political 
economy forces. Contrary to TTBs, which are used by developed and developing economies alike, 
large developed economies like the U.S. have virtually no tariff water with which to behave non-
cooperatively and have little variation over time in their applied tariffs. Conversely, developing 
economies have substantial tariff water in their schedules providing flexibility to potentially 
engage in protectionist trade policies. Note, the thirteen Latin American countries analyzed in this 
paper have an average level of tariff water of nearly 27 percent, illustrating a clear second avenue 
by which developing economies may respond to negative trade shocks.  
Thus, this paper analyzes TTB implementation by Latin American countries when subject 
to negative trade shocks and given market power, as well as analyzing the role of the presence or 
absence of tariff water on TTB implementation. This approach is motivated by theoretical 
predictions and empirical examples. Consider the latter:  In the early to mid-2000s Brazil imported 
approximately 20 distinct shoe2 products per year from China at the HS-06 level. From 2000 to 
                                               
2 Shoe or gaiter products all with HS-03 stem 640. 
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2007, 93 percent of these products had average levels of tariff water of approximately 14 percent. 
Given estimates in Nicita, Olarreaga and Silva (2015) that tariff water exceeding a threshold of 1 
percent is sufficient to transition from cooperative to non-cooperative behavior. Tariff water of 14 
percent provides ample flexibility for Brazil to potentially engage in protectionist policies through 
adjustment of the applied MFN tariff. This transpired in 2008 when tariff water dropped to just 2.4 
percent on average, with tariff water observed in only 3 of the 21 imported shoe products that year. 
Correspondingly with the new low levels of tariff water, Brazil implemented antidumping tariffs 
against two thirds of the shoe products imported from China in 2008. In 2009, tariff water 
continued to be observed at an average 2.7 percent for the shoe products while the antidumping 
measures remained in place.  This example demonstrates the intriguing interplay, unique to 
developing countries, that exists between TTB implementation and tariff water. 
There is substantial literature on the determinants of trade policy with respect to TTBs as 
well as applied MFN tariffs and tariff water, and we briefly discuss the pertinent highlights. In the 
case of TTBs, rigorous empirical analysis on the rise of TTB use and the determinants of TTB 
implementation has generally focused on developed countries and in particular the United States. 
Blonigen and Prusa (2001) conduct a literature review on the determinants and effects of 
antidumping use as a temporary trade barrier and the effects of significant rises in these protective 
measures. They cite numerous studies that estimate the determinants of U.S. AD filings over a 
large period of time (1958—1992). The literature they review indicates major observable variables 
that seem to be the fundamental drivers of AD petitions for the U.S.; such as import penetration, 
domestic industry employment and capital stock of a given industry.3  
                                               
3 In particular, Sabry (2000) analyzes US antidumping procedures and data to identify successful AD petitions. The 
paper finds that the import penetration ratio and concentration levels are major determinants of the decision to file 
an antidumping petitions for the United States. Additional studies include Finger (1981), Herander and Schwartz 
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Knetter and Prusa (2003) provide an additional investigation and empirical analysis of the 
rise and use of antidumping tariffs primarily focused on the U.S. They analyze how general 
macroeconomic factors and specifically fluctuations in real exchange rates affect the AD filing 
patterns of four major users of AD tariffs (U.S., Canada, EU and Australia) during the 1980s and 
1990s. They find that real exchange rates and domestic real GDP growth both have statistically 
significant impacts on AD filings and that dollar appreciations propagate antidumping activity4. 
Notably, the vast majority of TTB analysis and antidumping analysis in particular, has focused on 
the United States or a few other major developed economies. This paper strives to add to the body 
of knowledge and empirical evidence on the determinants of temporary trade barrier use and trade 
liberalization analysis in Latin American countries.  
With respect to tariff water and applied MFN tariffs there is a reasonable body of literature 
on choosing optimal tariffs and the fundamental role market power plays in tariff setting. Optimal 
tariff theory suggests that tariffs set non-cooperatively should be positively related to the importing 
countries’ market power. Otherwise known as the terms-of-trade argument, this implies that if a 
country has market power they can pass off the cost of a non-cooperative tariff onto the weaker 
exporting nation by causing a decrease in the price of the exported good (Bagwell and Staiger, 
2011). Thus, the greater the market power, the higher the tariffs.   
                                               
(1984), Feinberg and Hirsch (1989), Hanse (1990), Krupp (1994), Lichtenberg and Tan (1994), Furusawa and Prusa 
(1996), and Blonigen (2000) 
 
4 Leidy (1997) conducts a similar analysis to Knetter and Prusa (2003) and get analogous results but uses a smaller 
sample of U.S. aggregate filings. Whereas Feinberg (1989) which analyzes the impact of exchange rate movements 
on U.S. AD filings with respect to four major exporters (Brazil, Japan, Korea and Mexico), finds that a depreciation 
of the U.S. dollar with respect to a given foreign currency begets increased AD petitions. The proposed mechanism 
is that a foreign firm’s exports to the U.S. are at a lower price in foreign firms dollars given a U.S. dollar 
depreciation thus leading to an increase in the probability of a finding injury and thus an AD filing. 
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Broda, Limao and Weinstein (2008) quantify the importance of the terms-of-trade motive 
in tariff setting. One of their key findings demonstrates how, prior to WTO accession, countries 
with market power systematically exploited their terms-of-trade motive in the form of higher 
import tariffs on goods in which they had a high degree of market power. This is imperative for 
our analysis. Although all countries in our sample set are WTO members and are restricted by 
bound tariffs, they maintain significant tariff water in their schedules allowing for policy flexibility 
and the interplay between tariff water and TTB implementation. 
Furthermore Nicita, Olarreaga, and Silva (2015) provide rigorous analysis on the 
interaction between trade policies and tariff water as well as providing additional evidence 
supporting the importance of including tariff water in a trade policy setting analysis. Nicita et al. 
(2015) note that tariff water is observed in more than three quarters of WTO members’ tariff lines 
and this figure is even higher for our Latin American country set. As such, we include in our 
analysis a country’s ability, or not, to raise their applied MFN tariff rates. Moreover, it is possible 
that trade policy in Latin American countries may be a protective response to trade shocks as well 
as an exploitation of market power. Thus, in addition to more traditional analysis of the impetus 
of TTB use we also work to provide empirical evidence on the effect of the presence or absence 
of tariff water and market power on implementation of TTBs by Latin American countries. We do 
this by building on several key papers discussed below.  
Bown and Crowley (2013) develop an empirical model which considers governments’ use 
of antidumping and safeguard measures as time-varying trade policies given shocks to trade flows. 
Their empirical analysis provides evidence in support of the theoretical model constructed by 
Bagwell and Staiger (1990) that yields three predictions about the variation of import tariffs due 
to macroeconomic factors, taking into account the importing country’s market power and 
6 
efficiency losses related to protectionist measures. First, increases in import growth raise the 
probability of the implementation of a temporary trade barrier. Second, conditional on an increase 
in import growth the probability of an import tariff increases the more inelastic the export supply5 
, i.e., the greater the market power of a given country. Third, conditional on a given increase in 
import growth, the lower the volatility of import growth, the higher the likelihood of the 
implementation of a temporary trade barrier.  
Their primary empirical approach is to examine changes in the incentive to defect from 
cooperative trade policy by calculating the probability of an antidumping or safeguard tariff across 
time, countries and industrial sectors against U.S. imports. Their empirical results strongly support 
the three predictions that import growth, market power and import variance are significant factors 
in determining the implementation of TTBs. Their analysis focuses broadly on manufacturing and 
more specifically on steel and chemicals. In this paper, we consider their primary variables with 
adaptations to their empirical strategy as well as additional factors we believe contribute to the 
precipitation of TTB use in Latin American economies.  
Bown and Crowley (2014) shift their focus from specific analysis of the U.S. economy to 
a broader perspective of how major developing economies conduct their trade policy from 1989-
2010 and provide analysis on the impetus behind each countries’ respective policies. They do not 
however attempt to explain the application of TTBs on a bilateral basis but rather they estimate 
the impact of country level fluctuations on trade policies. In our analysis we consider the use of 
TTBs on a bilateral basis from 2000-2009.  
                                               
5 Bagwell and Staiger (1990) also include the import demand elasticity in their discussion. However we believe that 
market power and trade shocks can be viewed as alternative theories of trade policy determination and adhere to the 
strict terms of trade argument in our analysis which focuses solely on market power.  
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More specifically, Bown and Crowley (2014) analyze the increase in implementation of 
TTBs and strive to discern whether the increased use of TTBs signals commitment to WTO trade 
policy or if it is a retreat from liberal trade policy. Their investigation centers on counter-cyclical 
trade policy changes for emerging economies. They show that given a decrease in domestic real 
GDP growth in a country the potential terms-of-trade gain from protectionist trade policy can 
exceed the cost, especially if the country is in a persistent recession, as proposed by Bagwell and 
Staiger (2003), and that countries act according to these incentives. Ultimately, they find that 
import protection via increased use of TTBs reacts counter cyclically to real GDP growth, as 
predicted. Declines in growth for both the home and foreign countries result in statistically 
significant increased uses of TTBs (Bown and Crowley, 2013).  
Bown and Crowley (2014) do not account for market power in their analysis of emerging 
economies. This is important, as it is a well-established theory that terms-of-trade gains are related 
to a countries market power. Hence, this paper incorporates market power into the analysis of Latin 
American economies using estimates constructed by Olarreaga, Nicita and Silva (2015). 
Additionally, as indicated above, many developing countries have significant leeway in satisfying 
their WTO obligations while changing applied MFN tariffs6. Thus, it is plausible that Latin 
American countries are employing TTBs for market power reasons as well as considering levels 
of tariff water, in addition to reacting to trade shocks.  
                                               
6 Bown and Crowley (2014) also consider the relationship between the share of products legally bound by the WTO 
and TTB policies. They note a clear pattern; major emerging economies whose products are bound by WTO 
constraints disproportionately employ more TTBs. The authors consider a tariff within 10 percentage points of its 
legally binding rate to be “bound” in the sense that governments have little space in which to maneuver tariff levels 
to affect industry protection. They observe increased implementation of TTB protection when there is an increase in 
the number of imported products that face restrictions against raising MFN applied tariff rates, implying the demand 
for TTBs as a protectionist policy is a function of the proximity of WTO bounds.  
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Therefore in this paper, we consider variables used in the empirical strategy of Bown and 
Crowley (2013) and their underlying theoretical predictions on the influence of import shocks on 
the use of TTBs in Latin American economies. Additionally we consider the findings described in 
Nicita et al. (2015) and Bown and Crowley (2014) to incorporate the effect of market power and 
tariff water on the implementation of TTBs. 
Our empirical results confirm multiple theoretical predictions and question others. In our 
primary econometric specification we find that a one standard deviation increase in market power 
increases the probability of an antidumping tariff by 71 percent relative to its mean. We also find 
that the probability of an antidumping tariff increases given a one standard deviation in our lack 
of tariff water indicator variable by 20 percent relative to its mean. However, we do not find 
evidence that an increase in import growth has a statistically significant impact on a countries 
decision to implement a temporary trade barrier. We also find that a one standard deviation 
increase in a measure of variance of imports yields a 19 percent increase in the likelihood of an 
antidumping measure relative to the mean. Additionally, to investigate the robustness of our 
results, we extend our empirical analysis to control for political economy factors as well as 
including countervailing duties or safeguards in addition to antidumping tariffs. In the following 
chapter we provide a description of our data and discussion of our data set compilation. Chapter 3 
presents our empirical strategy. In chapter 4 we present our empirical results and we provide 
concluding remarks in chapter 5.  
  
9 
Chapter 2 - Data 
In this section we discuss the compilation of data sets that allow us to investigate the role 
of trade shocks, market power and tariff water in determining TTB use by Latin American 
countries. In order to empirically analyze the determinants of TTB use and their interaction with 
macroeconomic factors we use TTB data from thirteen countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Columbia, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay 
and Venezuela7. The primary source for TTB data is the Temporary Trade Barriers Databases 
found on the World Bank webpage and constructed by Chad Bown. This is the most 
comprehensive and detailed database available for historical trade policy data. Antidumping tariff 
data was gathered from the Global Antidumping Database (GAD), countervailing duty data was 
gathered from the Global Countervailing Duties Database (GCVD), and safeguard tariff data was 
gathered from the Global Safeguards Database (GSGD) (Bown 2015).  
Ultimately, the dependent variable in our econometric analysis is the count of HS-06 
country i imported products k that are subject to a new temporary trade barrier against exporting 
country j in time t resulting in import protection. The TTB data are originally presented as cases 
from importing country i against exporting country j at time t for product k at the Harmonized 
System 08-digit (HS-08) level. The highly dis-aggregated HS-08 product level data must be 
retooled to the HS-06 product level because this is the most finely dis-aggregated level of data that 
can be compared across countries (Bown and Crowley 2014). Thus, using the product specific 
information provided in Bown (2015) we reformat all HS-08 digit product codes to concord to the 
HS-06 level. To avoid double counting, when cases that include import protection at the HS-08  
                                               
7 Not all thirteen countries have AD, SG and CV data. We use available data from Bown (2015). 
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digit level fall into the same HS-06 level as a previously imposed measure, we treat these 
observations as a single TTB implementation at the HS-06 level. With the data aggregated at the 
HS-06 product level we have a data set with case initiation dates and the TTB measure imposed 
for all products at the HS-06 level for importing country i against exporting country j. This process 
is repeated for each country for antidumping, safeguard and countervailing data.  
Table 2.1 illustrates key observations from the aforementioned TTB data from 2000 to 
2009 for the thirteen Latin American economies that constitute our sample set.  Each importing 
country is listed in Column 1. Column 2 shows there were a total of 738 TTB cases initiated against 
unique products at the HS-06 level from 2000 to 2009 by the thirteen Latin American economies. 
Columns 3 through 5 list cases by antidumping, safeguards and countervailing duties respectively 
for each country. Note that the majority of cases are antidumping, followed by safeguards with 
minimal countervailing cases amongst the country set8.  As illustrated in the table there is a wide 
range of TTB usage between these Latin American countries. Column 6 shows that Argentina on 
average implemented about 30 new TTBs per year from 2000-2009 whereas the next highest user 
on average was Chile at 12 new cases per year. Furthermore, six countries in particular initiate the 
vast majority of TTBs during this time period. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru and 
Venezuela account for over 91 percent of all TTBs implemented from 2000 to 2009.  
  
                                               
8 Safeguard measures apply against all importers. Antidumping measures and Countervailing duties are applied on a 
bilateral basis against specific products and exporters.  
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Table 2.19: Temporary Trade Barrier Descriptive Statistics 
 
Source: Author using data from Bown (2015) 
*Reported as percentages 
 
Column 7 describes each specific importing economy’s entire stock of HS-06 products 
with non-zero imports for a given year that are subject to newly imposed TTBs. From 2000-2009 
Argentina subjected on average 0.7 percent of its yearly HS-06 imports to new TTBs, more than 
any other country in the sample set. The previous TTB analysis literature usually focuses on the 
U.S. in part, because it is considered one of the greatest users of TTBs by a simple count measure 
of TTBs implemented. However, the U.S. only imposes TTBs against 0.16 percent of its products 
per year which is significantly less than Argentina as well as multiple countries in our sample set. 
                                               
9 The total number of products against which there are TTBs is less than the sum of the AD, SG and CV columns. 
This is due to the fact that when there is a product that is subject to two or more TTBs this is counted only as a 
single incidence, to avoid double counting. There are a few instances when this occurs which explains the disparity.  
TTB AD SG CV
Argentina 268 168 100 0 29.8 0.687 2.024
Brazil 90 89 0 7 10.0 0.207 0.745
Chile 109 3 106 0 12.1 0.274 1.635
Colombia 29 29 0 0 3.2 0.074 0.296
Costa Rica 3 2 0 1 0.3 0.009 0.052
Jamaica 8 4 6 0 0.9 0.028 0.191
Mexico 35 33 0 2 3.9 0.076 0.458
Panama 13 0 13 0 1.4 0.049 0.215
Peru 86 81 0 5 9.6 0.238 1.314
Paraguay 1 1 0 0 0.1 0.004 0.024
Trinidad and Tobago 6 6 0 0 0.7 0.021 0.143
Uruguay 4 4 0 0 0.4 0.013 0.116
Venezuela 86 1 84 1 9.6 0.218 1.704
Total 738 421 309 16 6.3 0.146 0.686
Country
Total number of new products from 2000-
2009 subject to:
Average TTB 
Implementation: 
2000-2009
 Average Share of 
Products subject 
to new TTBs: 
2000-2009*
 Average Share of 
Products subject to 
all imposed TTBs in 
effect: 2000-2009*
12 
Thus TTB implementation as a share of imported products for countries in our sample set is 
relatively large or at least in line with the U.S.  
The final column provides information on the share of imported products subject to all 
imposed TTBs in effect over the time period 2000-2009 for our sample set. This was constructed 
with the set of HS-06 products using a non-redundant count of affected HS-06 products divided 
by the specific economy’s entire stock of HS-06 products with non-zero imports for a given year. 
Notice that we only consider a TTB measure applied in year 2000 or after and if it remains in effect 
until the revocation date. Argentina subjected an annual average of over 2 percent of their yearly 
imports to TTBs from 2000-2009 followed by Venezuela, Chile and Peru, all with well over 1 
percent of their total products subjected to TTBs.  
The TTB data from Bown (2015) were merged with a detailed and comprehensive trade 
and market power dataset constructed and provided by Nicita et al. (2015) to form a panel dataset 
allowing for analysis between TTB incidence, applied MFN tariffs, import data, tariff water and 
market power. Table 2.2 provides a summary of the tariff, market power and import data for each 
of the countries in Column 1. Column 2 shows the average applied MFN tariff for each country 
over the time period 2000-2009. Costa Rica has the lowest applied MFN tariff at 6 percent and 
Mexico has the highest applied rate at 15 percent. The country group average nearly 11 percent. 
Column 3 shows the average WTO bound tariff rate from 2000-2009. Panama has the lowest WTO 
tariff bound at 23 percent and Trinidad and Tobago has the highest at 57 percent with the country 
group average at 36 percent. Column 4 shows the average level of tariff water for each country 
over the same time period where tariff water is defined as: 
𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑊𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟 =  𝑊𝑇𝑂 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝐵𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 − 𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑑 𝑀𝐹𝑁 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓 
13 
Panama has the lowest average tariff water at 16 percent where Trinidad and Tobago has 
the highest average at 48 percent and the group average is 26 percent. It is important to note the 
ubiquitous presence of tariff water throughout the country set. As discussed in the introduction, 
Nicita et al. (2015) demonstrate the importance of tariff water in setting cooperative tariffs. The 
levels of tariff water present in our country set are clearly non-trivial across the sample set. In this 
paper we consider a tariff within 5 percentage points of its legally binding rate to be “bound” as 
opposed to the mark of 10 percentage points used by Bown and Crowley (2014) given results in 
Nicita et al. (2015) that changes to tariff levels can be observed when tariff water exceeds 1 
percent.  
Table 2.2: Tariff, Market Power and Import Data Description 2000-2009  
 
Source: Author using data from World Bank’s Wits at wits.worldbank.org and data provided by Nicita et 
al (2015) 
 
Column 5 shows the share of imported products by each country that have tariff water 
levels of 5 percent or less, i.e. products that are bound by the WTO. The entire sample has just 6 
percent of their products bound by the WTO from 2000-2009, further indicating that the countries 
Country
Applied 
MFN 
Tariff
WTO 
Bound 
Tariff 
Tariff 
Water
Share of 
Products 
Bound by 
WTO
Export 
Supply 
Elasticity
Market 
Power
Median 
Import 
growth
Argentina 0.124 0.317 0.19 0.047 60.70 0.0165 6.644
Brasil 0.137 0.311 0.17 0.067 49.34 0.0203 13.15
Chile 0.066 0.251 0.19 0.000 68.93 0.0145 4.357
Colombia 0.123 0.412 0.29 0.000 66.77 0.0150 7.448
Costa Rica 0.058 0.428 0.37 0.037 102.0 0.0098 3.319
Jamaica 0.084 0.508 0.42 0.032 113.9 0.0088 6.586
Mexico 0.154 0.350 0.20 0.158 28.63 0.0349 0.483
Panama 0.077 0.233 0.16 0.348 104.1 0.0096 16.39
Peru 0.096 0.301 0.20 0.001 85.34 0.0117 7.695
Paraguay 0.118 0.329 0.21 0.079 126.4 0.0079 4.516
Trinidad and Tobago 0.084 0.566 0.48 0.015 126.6 0.0079 2.015
Uruguay 0.126 0.314 0.19 0.051 134.4 0.0074 0.411
Venezuela 0.130 0.356 0.23 0.058 67.31 0.0149 0.000
14 
in our sample set retain significant flexibility to make trade policy decisions through the applied 
MFN tariff mechanism and the existence of pervasive tariff water.  
Column 6 shows the export supply elasticity for each country. Uruguay has the highest 
export supply elasticity at 134 and Mexico has the lowest at 28 followed by Brazil and Argentina. 
The group average is 87. These results are as predicted, given that larger economies generally have 
smaller export supply elasticities. Thus expecting the greatest users to have lower export supply 
elasticities implies they will have greater market power. This is observed in column 8 where 
Mexico has the highest market power followed by all other major users of TTBs with the exception 
of Colombia which has the fourth highest market power but does not implement many TTBs. 
These estimates concur with the relative size of the economies. Although the average market power 
is not large in comparison with the U.S. or European Union, the standard deviation is substantial, 
and there are also myriad products for which the non-cooperative tariffs are above 10 percentage 
points, leaving ample room for policy setting10.  
The last column shows the median import growth for the country set from 2000-2009. 
Import growth for each year, t-1, is calculated using the following formula.11  
𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 =  
(𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−2)
𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−2
 
Since antidumping measures require time to implement, it is unlikely that the causal effect 
of an import surge on antidumping measure implementation will play out within a single calendar 
year. Thus, using a lagged measure of import growth allows us to analyze the effect of a change 
                                               
10 As discussed in Broda et al. (2008) and Nicita et al. (2008) market power is related to economic size, the share of 
the importer in a particular market and product characteristics where imports of differentiated products result, on 
average, in greater degrees of market power. 
 
11 We report the median import growth as opposed the mean import growth from 2000-2009 because of the large 
variance in import growth from year to year. The median provides a more accurate description. 
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in the growth of imports on the following year’s probability of an implementation of a new TTB 
measure against a specific HS-06 product. All countries exhibit positive median import growth 
from 2000-2009.  
Lastly it is important to note that TTB import protection can be selectively imposed, 
targeting both specific countries and products. Thus TTBs are precise instruments of protection 
and can be concentrated against certain trading partners. We observe this in the data. Figure 2.1 
provides information on the most affected exporters to the thirteen Latin American countries. 
Approximately 30 percent of all newly imposed TTBs from 2000 to 2009 by the thirteen Latin 
American economies were implemented against Chinese products.  China is followed by 10 
percent against Brazilian products, and 6 percent against European Union, US and Argentinian 
products.  The rest of the newly implemented TTBs were against products from 46 countries. There 
is not a discernable pattern with respect to the remaining countries. They consist of developed and 
emerging economies across diverse geographic regions.  
Figure 2.1: Incidence of TTBs on Trade Partners 
 
Source: Author using data from Bown (2015) 
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Though our primary focus is on data at the HS-06 level, we also conduct the above analysis 
for all data at the HS-04 level. This allows us to consider our empirical analysis at multiple product 
levels to test the robustness of our results. To carry out these robustness checks, note that we use 
data on the elasticity of export supply estimated at the HS-04 digit level. The correlation between 
the elasticity estimates at the HS-06 and HS-04 levels is extremely high, at 0.92. Lastly, for our 
final robustness check we re-estimate several specifications on the HS-04 and HS-06 data sets that 
have been aggregated to the importer level. 
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Chapter 3 - Empirical Strategy 
In this chapter we describe our empirical strategy for analyzing how countries adjust their 
use of temporary trade barriers over time given market power, shocks to trade flows and tariff 
water. The inspiration of our econometric model comes from the econometric strategy employed 
by Bown and Crowley (2013). Our baseline specification is: 
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 (
1
𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑘
) + 𝛽2𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 [  (
1
𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑘
) × 𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡−1] + 𝛽4𝜎𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡  
Where 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡  is a binary measure of a temporary trade barrier imposed by country i against 
country j in year t against product k. We principally consider the implementation of antidumping 
tariffs but also incorporate safeguard tariffs and countervailing duties into our later analysis. 
(
1
𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑘
) is the inverse of the export supply elasticity for product k from country i, otherwise known 
as market power. As shown by the standard terms-of-trade argument, the greater the market power 
the greater the increase in tariff protection.  Broda et al. (2008) and Nicita et al. (2015) empirically 
confirm these predictions. Thus, 𝛽1 is expected to be positive, indicating that greater market power 
begets increased use of TTB measures.   
𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡−1 is a measure of the lagged growth in imports for product k to country i from country 
j in year t.  The theory from Bagwell and Staiger (1990) suggests that surges in imports bring about 
strong incentives for importing countries to defect from cooperative trade policy and therefore 
increase the probability of a given country implementing protective trade instruments. Thus the 
expected sign of 𝛽2 is positive. Given that the implementation of protective trade measures due to 
an import surge is also related to the elasticities of the countries involved, the variable 
[  (
1
𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑘
) × 𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡−1] allows for the interaction between import growth and elasticities. 𝛽3 is 
predicted to be positive according to Bagwell and Staiger (1990). 𝜎𝑖𝑗𝑘  is a measure of the standard 
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deviation of imports of product k  by country i from country j.  Bagwell and Staiger (1990) posit 
that the more volatile the import growth in a given industry the more unlikely the imposition of a 
tariff against that industry, hence 𝛽4 is predicted to be negative.  
Given that 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 is a binary variable, we report estimates using a probit model. We use 
values of market power provided by Nicita et al. (2015) to estimate the above baseline 
specification.  Additionally, before estimating our baseline model, due to the fact that our sample 
set countries have both extremely high and low values of export supply elasticity we estimate our 
model on a data set where we drop the top and bottom 5 percent of the distribution of the primary 
sample to assuage concerns that extreme values are affecting the results. Thus, our baseline 
specification (1), is estimated over imported products k from all industries, where i=sample Latin 
American country set, j=the set of exporting countries and t=2000—2009. Our baseline model 
has 1,122,820 observations. 
We then augment the baseline specification to include only manufacturing products based 
on the NAICS 6-digit level of classification by concording the NAICS to our HS-06 digit level 
data set. This forms specification (2), which takes the same econometric form as specification (1) 
estimated over the manufacturing product only data set. Specification (2) has 1,083,006 
observations.  
Next, since we purpose to investigate the role of tariff water in the trade policy of Latin 
American Countries, in addition to import shocks we add a tariff water indicator variable to 
specification (2) to capture trade policy substitution over time and across instruments. Bown and 
Crowley (2014) analyze this effect by using a variable constructed by lagged change in the share 
of imported products under WTO discipline.  However in this paper we take a different approach. 
We do not consider the share of products bound by the WTO, rather we analyze specific products 
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and consider a product to be bound if its applied MFN tariff is within 5 percentage points of its 
WTO bound. Thus we introduce an absence of water indicator variable: 
𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟 ≤ 5 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟 > 5 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠
 
Where a value of “1” for any country i against country j and product k in time t acts as a 
proxy for the lack of policy space with respect to applied MFN tariffs in which a country could 
protect their industries by increasing applied MFN tariffs, indicating TTBs are their primary 
protectionist option. A value of “0” indicates there exists sufficient tariff water in which a country, 
in principle, could forgo the use of a TTB and simply raise their applied MFN tariff to impede a 
surge in imports. Thus we expect the coefficient of 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 to be positive.  
Therefore our primary econometric model is specification (3), and has 1,035,535 
observations: 
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 (
1
𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑘
) + 𝛽2𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 [  (
1
𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑘
) × 𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡−1] + 𝛽4𝜎𝑖𝑗𝑘 +  𝛽5𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡  
Lastly, given challenges to identifying the causal effect of import shocks and tariff water 
on the implementation of TTBs across time, industries and countries we control for multiple fixed 
effects. Notably, it is difficult to acquire reliable information on output levels, employment, capital 
levels, etc. for all of the developing countries in our sample set. Thus, we are unable to include 
myriad political economy factors in our analysis, yet we control for them by using industry, 
country and time fixed effects.  Furthermore we expand upon our baseline and primary 
specifications by employing various additional robustness checks. 
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Chapter 4 - Empirical Results 
Tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 present empirical results on the impetus of TTB for 13 Latin 
American countries. To simplify the exposition, we briefly summarize our results and then go over 
each Table in detail. We find that the likelihood of an antidumping tariff being imposed rises by a 
robust 71 percent in response to a one standard deviation increase in market power relative to its 
mean value. When including countervailing duties or safeguards in addition to antidumping tariffs, 
the response is a 70 percent and a 52 percent increase in the likelihood of TTB imposition, 
respectively. The magnitude of these results is significant and in line with Bown and Crowley 
(2013). Additionally, we find that a one standard deviation increase in the lack of tariff water 
indicator leads to a 20 percent increase in the likelihood of an antidumping tariff relative to its 
mean. When including countervailing duties or safeguards in addition to antidumping tariffs, the 
response is a 28 and a 20 percent increase in the likelihood of TTB imposition, respectively. These 
results are significant and agree with our prediction that given a lower level of tariff water, a 
country is more likely to implement a TTB.  
We also find that a one standard deviation increase in bilateral import growth does not 
yield statistically significant estimates for antidumping tariffs. This is also the case for 
countervailing duties or safeguard tariffs in addition to antidumping tariffs. Lastly, we find that a 
one standard deviation increase in a measure of variance of imports yields a 19 percent increase in 
the likelihood of an antidumping measure relative to the mean. Including countervailing duties or 
safeguards in addition to antidumping tariffs, yields predictions 19 and 18 percent increases 
respectively. These results contrast with Bown and Crowley (2013). 
Our collective results strongly suggest that the driving forces in trade policy setting for 
Latin American countries are market power and the absence of tariff water as opposed to import 
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shocks. Finally, we demonstrate that our results are robust to augmenting our primary specification 
with additional variables as well as when controlling for country, industry and year fixed effects. 
We present our empirical results in three tables. Table 4.1 presents our baseline probit 
model and the baseline with multiple extensions, such as accounting for manufacturing products, 
the lack of tariff water and controlling for country, industry and year fixed effects. In table 4.2 we 
present robustness checks at the HS-04 and HS-06 digit level of our baseline model and of our 
primary model incorporating various additional variables. In table 4.3 we estimate our model at 
the HS-04 and HS-06 digit levels on the original data sets aggregated to the importer level as a 
further robustness check.   
The Tables 4.1 and 4.2 illustrate results in two ways. First in the top panel of each Table, 
the coefficients of probit estimates are presented where 𝛽𝑖 is the direct effect of an independent 
variable on the predicted probability of an increase in the likelihood of the dependent variable. For 
example, our baseline model has a positive coefficient 𝛽1, indicating an increase in the probability 
of the implementation of antidumping tariffs given an increase in market power. Analogous 
analysis is used to interpret the coefficients of other independent variables.  
Additionally, given the fact that there is interaction between market power and import 
shocks,[(
1
𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑘
) × 𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡−1  ], as well as direct coefficients, we need to consider the direct and the 
indirect effects of import shocks and market power on the probability of TTB implementation. To 
accomplish this we report the cumulative effects of the independent variables as the percent change 
in predicted probability of the implementation of an antidumping tariff (or safeguard or 
countervailing duty) given a one standard deviation increase in the independent variable with 
respect to the predicted probability evaluated at the mean.  
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To accomplish this we must first calculate the cumulative marginal effects accounting for 
both direct and indirect effects of market power and import growth. We calculate the cumulative 
marginal effects by: 
∂Pr(𝑌𝑖𝑘𝑡  =  AD|𝐱)
∂M𝑖𝑑𝑘
= ϕ(𝛃′𝐱) (𝛽1 + 𝛽3 (
1
𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑘
)) 
Where 𝛃′𝐱 and (
1
𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑘
) are evaluated at the sample mean and ϕ(⋅) is the standard normal 
density used for all probit models. We then multiply the estimated cumulative marginal effect of 
βi by a one standard deviation change in the independent variable. Finally, we divide by the mean 
of the predicted probability of an antidumping measure or other TTB implementation, yielding an 
estimate of the percent change in predicted probability of TTB implementation relative to its mean.  
 4.1 Baseline Results 
Turn now to the results in Table 4.1. Our first result is that the coefficient of market power 
is positive and significant indicating that an increase in market power leads to an increased 
probability of an antidumping tariff being imposed. In the lower panel of Table 4.1 column 1 note 
that a one standard deviation increase in market power evaluated with respect to the sample mean 
represents a 68 percent increase in the probability of an antidumping measure. This strongly 
indicates that market power plays an integral role in trade policy determination for our sample set.  
The coefficient of import growth is positive and significant indicating that an increase in 
import growth leads to an increase in the likelihood of the implementation of an antidumping tariff. 
However, note that the coefficient of the interaction term is negative and insignificant. Thus, when 
analyzing the lower panel of Table 4.1 column 1, the net marginal effect of import growth after 
taking into account the indirect effect from the interaction term is not positive nor significant. This 
result is consistent across many specifications, signaling that Latin American economies are not 
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responding to trade shocks as theoretically predicted or in line with previous empirical evidence 
from the U.S. 
The coefficient of the standard deviation of import growth is positive and significant. The 
lower panel shows that when evaluated with respect to the sample mean a one standard deviation 
increase in the measure of variance of import growth leads to a 10 percent increase in the likelihood 
of an antidumping tariff. This result deviates from the theoretical predictions of Bagwell and 
Staiger (1990).  
Column 2 of Table 4.1 re-estimates the baseline model over manufacturing products as 
defined by the 6-digit level of the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) 
concorded with our data set at the HS-06 product level. The results are extremely similar to 
specification (1) with the only differences being slightly larger coefficients and modest increases 
in the percent change of predicted probability of an antidumping tariff implementation given a one 
standard deviation increase in market power and the standard deviation of import growth with 
respect to their means.  
Column 3 presents our primary model; which consists of specification (2) and the addition 
of a lack of tariff water indicator variable. The results for specification (3) are virtually equivalent 
to those of specification (1) and (2) for the previously discussed independent variables. Our 
additional independent variable, the lack of tariff water indicator, has the predicted positive and 
significant coefficient, indicating an increase in the probability of an antidumping tariff given a 
decrease in tariff water. 
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Table 4.1: Results HS-06 Antidumping Implementation: Coefficients and Predicted 
Probabilities from a Probit Model 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. A probit model is used to estimate all specifications. Note 
that columns 4 and 5 estimate country, industry and time fixed effects. To control for fixed effects in columns (4) and 
(5) we re-estimated the model with a linear probability model. The estimates were analogous to using the probit model. 
***Significant at the 1 percent level  
** Significant at the 5 percent level 
*Significant at the 10 percent level 
a Rescaled by a factor of 10-5 for estimation 
Baseline
Manufacturing 
Products Only
Add Tariff 
Water 
Indicator
(1) (2) (3) Industry X Country Industry X Year
Market Power 0.0878** 0.0900** 0.0909** 0.0725* 0.0854** 
(0.0322) (0.0322) (0.0325) (0.0367) (0.033)
Import Growth
a 0.454*** 0.445*** 0.417*** 0.318** 0.454** 
(0.112) (0.113) (0.117) (0.121) (0.174)   
-8.120 -8.094 -7.693 -2.508* -2.806   
(6.379) (6.384) (6.371) (1.059) (2.509)   
0.0807*** 0.143*** 0.145*** 0.147*** 0.152***
(0.0102) (0.0147) (0.0147) (0.0144) (0.0136)   
— — 0.198*** 0.321*** 0.263***
— — (0.0590) (0.0925) (0.0574)   
Observations 1122820 1083006 1035535 1035535 1035535
Prob > Chi-Squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Market Power 68** 70** 71** 61* 73**
Import Growth -111 -112 -107 -28 -27
Standard Deviation of Import Growth 10** 19*** 19*** 19*** 20***
Lack of Tariff Water Indicator — — 20** 45*** 37***
Fixed Effects of Specification (3)
Import Growth  X Marketpower
Standard Deviation of Import Growth
a
Lack of Tariff Water Indicator
Percent change in predicted probability of TTB implementation 
given a one standard deviation increase in each independent 
variable with respect to the sample mean:
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The lower panel of the table yields predictions in line with the previous specifications for 
the baseline model independent variables. For the lack of tariff water indicator we observe a 20 
percent increase in the predicted probability of the implementation of an antidumping measure 
given a one standard deviation increase in the lack of tariff water indicator with respect to its 
sample mean. This estimate is significant and provides empirical evidence that tariff water levels 
below five percentage points indicate products are effectively bound by the WTO and countries 
are unable to increase their applied MFN tariff rate, thereby increasing the probability of a country 
implementing an antidumping measure for a bound product. This concurs with our prediction.  
In column 4 of Table 4.1 we estimate our primary model, specification (3), over demeaned 
variables to control for both industry and country fixed effects given the dearth of available 
industry and political economy data for our country set. The coefficients for market power and 
lack of tariff water indicator are positive and statistically significant indicating that an increase in 
market power, or an absence of tariff water, leads to an increase in the probability of the 
implementation of an antidumping tariff. Similarly, in the lower panel of Table 4.1 a one standard 
deviation increase in market power and lack of tariff water indicator evaluated with respect to their 
sample means, represents a 61 and 45 percent increase in the probability of an antidumping 
measure respectively. These estimates confirm our earlier results while controlling for country and 
industry fixed effects. 
The estimates for import growth and the standard deviation of import growth also closely 
dovetail with our primary results. The cumulative effect of import growth on the percent change 
in predicted probability of antidumping tariff implementation given a one standard deviation 
increase in import growth remains insignificant while a one standard deviation change in the 
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measure of variance precipitates at 19 percent increase in the probability of antidumping tariff 
implementation.  
In column 5 of Table 4.1 we present estimates of our primary model over demeaned 
variables to control for industry and time trend fixed effects. The results are analogous to our first 
robustness check as well as to our primary model for both coefficient estimates and predicted 
probability percent change evaluated at the mean given a one standard deviation change in the 
independent variables. They confirm the previous results that increases in market power and lack 
of tariff water indicator lead to robust increases in the predicted probability of the implementation 
of an antidumping tariff. While import growth and the standard deviation of import growth yield 
counter-theoretical predictions, further contributing to our results that market power is a major 
driver of Latin American trade policy.  
Importantly all specifications in Table 4.1 have a miniscule p-values of less than 0.000 
leading us to conclude that at least one of the coefficients of the regression is not equal to zero for 
all specifications. Additionally, there are over 1 million observations for each specification in 
Table 4.1.  
 4.2 Robustness  
Table 4.2 introduces multiple robustness checks to our baseline and primary models. 
Column 1 of Table 4.2 presents estimates of our primary model, specification (3), for our data set 
retooled to the HS-04 digit level. The coefficient estimates of market power are positive and 
significant and are in line with those at the HS-06 level. The percent change in predicted 
probability of a newly imposed antidumping measure given a one standard deviation increase in 
market power with respect to the mean is a robust 87 percent, confirming our earlier results. The 
lack of tariff water coefficient is positive but not significant and the total marginal effect of a one 
standard deviation change evaluated at the mean is not statistically significant. Other coefficients 
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and predicted probabilities are closely in line with previous estimates from Table 4.1, specification 
(3) at the HS-06 digit level.  
Column 2 presents results from our primary model with the addition of a dummy variable 
for Chinese products. While Chinese products make up just 7 percent of all unique imported 
products by our sample set countries, nearly 51 percent of all antidumping measures are 
implemented against Chinese products. Brazil by comparison, is the next highest recipient of 
antidumping measures and is subject to just 12 percent of the antidumping measures employed. 
The coefficient estimates and predicted probabilities with respect to a one standard deviation 
change in the independent variables evaluated at the mean closely mirror those of the primary 
model, (Table 4.1, column 3) with the exception of slightly larger coefficients across the board. 
When controlling for Chinese products, the coefficient on market power remains positive and 
significant and the increase in the likelihood of an antidumping tariff evaluated at its mean is 67 
percent given a one standard deviation increase, akin to previous estimates. The Chinese product 
indicator variable is statistically significant and positive indicating that if a product originates in 
China there is an increase in the likelihood of an antidumping measure. The percent change in 
predicted probability of an antidumping measure given a one standard deviation increase in the 
Chinese product indicator variable yields a 60 percent increase with respect to the sample mean.  
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Table 4.2: Robustness results from probit models 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. A probit model is used to estimate all specifications. Note 
that columns 5 and 6 estimate country, industry and time fixed effects. To control for fixed effects in columns (5) and 
(6) we re-estimated the model with a linear probability model. The estimates were analogous to using the probit model. 
***Significant at the 1 percent level  
** Significant at the 5 percent level 
*Significant at the 10 percent level 
a Rescaled by a factor of 10-5 for estimation 
bAntidumping tariff or countervailing duty used as dependent variable in specification (3) 
cAntidumping tariff or safeguard tariff used as dependent variable in specification (4) 
 
 
 
Specification (3): 
HS-04
Specification (3) 
+ China Indicator
Specification (3): 
AD and CV
b
Specification (3): 
AD and SG
c
Specification (3): 
Brazil Only
(1) (2) (3) (4) Industry X Country Industry X Year (7)
Market Power 0.0983*** 0.103** 0.0882** 0.0587 0.0169 0.109*** 0.166**
(0.0282) (0.0337) (0.0322) (0.0314) (0.0443) (0.0279) (0.0610)
Import Growth
a 0.00506 0.483*** 0.420*** 0.245* -1.198 0.455 2.109**
(0.0852) (0.126) (0.119) (0.115) (1.599) (0.681) (0.694)
-0.217 -15.83 -8.424 -0.486 -6.398 -5.585 -10.49
(0.572) (11.72) (6.971) (1.569) (4.373) (8.030) (7.864)
0.0907*** 0.127*** 0.145*** 0.141*** 0.0906*** 0.0940*** 0.146***
(0.00836) (0.0158) (0.0145) (0.0142) (0.00847) (0.00813) (0.0378)
0.0274 0.238*** 0.190** 0.141* 0.0438 0.0947 0.507***
(0.1000) (0.0614) (0.0589) (0.0585) (0.179) (0.0865) (0.0952)
Indicator of Chinese 
Products
— 0.675*** — — — — —
— (0.0352) — — — — —
Observations 539544 1035535 1035535 1035535 539544 539544 111781
Prob > Chi-Squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Market Power 87*** 67** 70** 52* 10 91*** 105*
Import Growth -4.5 -227 -107 3.1 -167 -104 -138
12*** 16*** 19** 18*** 12*** 12*** 18***
3.8 32*** 28*** 20** 6 13 66***
Indicator of Chinese 
Products
— 60*** — — — — —
Lack of Tariff Water 
Indicator
Country Fixed Effects: Specification 
(3) HS-04
Import Growth  X 
Marketpower
Standard Deviation of 
Import Growth
a
Lack of Tariff Water 
Indicator
Percent change in predicted probability of TTB implementation 
given a one standard deviation increase in each independent 
variable with respect to the sample mean:
Standard Deviation of 
Import Growth
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In column 3 we re-estimate the primary model where the binary dependent variable is the 
implementation of either an antidumping measure or countervailing duty. The coefficients and 
predicted changes in probabilities given a one standard deviation increase in each independent 
variable are nearly identical to our primary model, specification (3) from Table 4.1, further 
confirming our initial results. In column 4 we re-estimate the primary model where the binary 
dependent variable is the implementation of either an antidumping measure or safeguard tariff. 
Column 4 also yields results generally in line with our primary model coefficients. The percent 
change in the predicted probability of an antidumping or safeguard tariff being implemented is 52 
percent for a one standard deviation change in market power, modestly less than with specification 
(3) Table 4.1, but still coinciding with the general results.   
Columns 5 is analogous to column 4 from Table 4.1 except it controls for industry and 
country fixed effects over the data set retooled to the HS-04 level from the HS-06 level. Coefficient 
estimates in column 5 generally agree with the consistent trends seen throughout our multiple 
specifications; however market power, import growth and lack of tariff water indicator variables 
do not have statistically significant coefficients. Only the standard deviation of import growth 
yields a statistically significant percent change in predicted probability of an antidumping measure.  
Columns 6 is analogous to columns 5 from Table 4.1 except it controls for industry and 
time fixed effects over the data set retooled to the HS-04 level from the HS-06 level. The market 
power coefficient is positive and statistically significant. The percent change in predicted 
probability of an antidumping tariff given and one standard deviation increase in market power 
yields a robust result of a 91 percent increase with respect to the mean. These results concur with 
previous estimates on the effects of market power. Other estimates are in line with previous results 
with the exception of the lack of tariff water indicator variable, which does not yield a statistically 
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significant estimate. Thus, when controlling for industry and time fixed effects our primary result 
of positive and significant market power prevails.   
Column 7 considers our primary model, specification (3) from Table 4.1, with specific 
analysis of Brazil. Brazil is a significant user of TTBs; they subjected 2 percent of their products 
per year to new TTBs from 2000-2009 on average. Additionally they had an average of 17 
percentage points of tariff water from 2000-2009 and had the second greatest market power in our 
sample set. Thus, Brazil’s characteristics make it a unique candidate for specialized analysis. 
Estimates of the primary model generally concord with previous results. However the predicted 
increases in likelihood of an antidumping tariff due to a one standard deviation increase in market 
power and lack of tariff water yield more robust results of 105 and 66 percent increases evaluated 
at the mean. Given the specific country characteristics this accords with our predictions.  
Finally note that columns 1, 5 and 6 with estimates on the HS-04 data set have over 500,000 
observations. Columns 2, 3 and 4 that estimate on the HS-06 data set have over 1.3 million 
observations. Column 7, which considers only Brazil, still has over 100,000 observations. Lastly, 
all specifications in Table 4.2 have a miniscule p-values of less than 0.000 leading us to conclude 
that at least one of the coefficients of the regression is not equal to zero for all specifications. 
In Table 4.3 we offer a further robustness check of our primary results. Previous models 
were estimated over bilateral data sets at the HS-06 and HS-04 digit levels although import shocks 
vary drastically amongst our country set. Thus, it is plausible that a given industry will not seek 
protection for any specific import shock by one exporter to an already volatile market. Rather it is 
possible that the industry may be more responsive given aggregate import shocks. To examine this 
potentiality we estimate our models on the data sets aggregated to the importer level as opposed 
to previous bilateral analysis. Columns 1 and 2 estimate our baseline and primary models while 
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column 3 estimates our baseline model after controlling for industry and country fixed effects on 
the HS-06 data set aggregated to the importer level. Columns 4 through 6 estimate the same models 
on the HS-04 data set aggregated to the importer level.  
Table 4.3: Probit estimates over aggregated data sets 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. A probit model is used to estimate all specifications. Note 
that columns 3 and 6 estimate country, industry and time fixed effects. To control for fixed effects in columns (3) and 
(6) we re-estimated the model with a linear probability model. The estimates were analogous to using the probit model. 
***Significant at the 1 percent level  
** Significant at the 5 percent level 
*Significant at the 10 percent level 
a Rescaled by a factor of 10-3 for estimation 
b Rescaled by a factor of 10-5 for estimation 
 
Table 4.3 confirms the results in tables 4.1 and 4.2. Market power, with the exception of 
column three, yields results that are positive and significant indicating that even with respect to 
total imports, market power plays an important role in the implementation of antidumping tariffs. 
Additionally, at the HS-06 digit level the lack of tariff water indicator is both positive and 
significant, analogous to previous results. Notably import shocks, even when analyzed with respect 
HS-06 
Baseline
HS-06 
Specification 
(3)
HS-06 Baseline: 
Country x Industry 
Fixed Effects 
HS-04 
Baseline
HS-04 
Specification 
(3)
HS-04 Baseline: 
Country x Industry 
Fixed Effects 
Market Power
a 0.0848* 0.0889* 0.0597 0.186*** 0.181*** 0.151** 
(0.0370) (0.0373) (0.0409) (0.0377) (0.0381) (0.0513)   
Import Growth
b -0.927 -0.661 -474.2 -8.837 -9.353 -7830.5   
(2.090) (1.838) (907.1) (6.478) (6.642) (5403.4)   
-2.476 -2.458 112.2 19.23 21.23 -59476.6   
(5.742) (5.535) (794.4) (15.92) (15.64) (31253.4)   
0.0577*** 0.0578*** 52.44*** 0.0463*** 0.0455*** 45.36***
(0.00968) (0.0102) (11.09) (0.00681) (0.00684) (7.926)   
— 0.340*** — — 0.188 —
— (0.0691) — — (0.122) —
Observations 264206 254344 264206 84565 84362 84565
Prob > Chi-Squared 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Standard Deviation of 
Import Growth
b
Import Growth  X 
Marketpower
Lack of Tariff Water 
Indicator
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to aggregate imports, mirror our earlier estimates presented in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. The coefficients 
are not significant, illustrating that across multiple levels of analysis import shocks are not 
significant determinants of TTB implementation amongst our country set. Furthermore, estimates 
of a one standard deviation change in the independent variables, evaluated with respect to their 
means are analogous to previous results in Tables 4.1 and 4.2.  
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Chapter 5 - Conclusions 
In this paper we take a unique approach to analyzing trade policy decisions by Latin 
American countries when subject to import shocks and given market power. Adapting Bown and 
Crowley’s (2013) empirical strategy to include additional explanatory variables and variables 
unique to developing economies we provide new insights into trade policy decisions by Latin 
American economies. Using detailed temporary trade barrier data from Bown (2015) as well as 
comprehensive trade and market power data from Nicita et al. (2015) we present results from a 
probit model on the unique interplay between market power, tariff water and import shocks for 13 
Latin American economies from 2000-2009.  
First, we find strong supportive evidence for the prediction that an increase in market power 
leads to an increase in use of temporary trade barriers. Empirically our results show that a one 
standard deviation increase in market power increases the predicted probability of an antidumping 
tariff by 71 percent compared to the mean. Second, we find that when products do not have large 
amounts of tariff water, i.e. they are bound by the WTO, countries are more likely to implement 
temporary trade barriers against those products. Our results show that a one standard deviation 
increase in the lack of tariff water indicator increases the predicted probability of an antidumping 
tariff by 20 percent compared to the mean. Importantly, these two results are robust to controlling 
for industry, country and time trend fixed effects as well as the addition of countervailing duties 
or safeguard tariffs with antidumping tariffs. Furthermore we show that these results are robust to 
augmenting our empirical specifications to include additional variables. 
Our third and fourth results are that a one standard deviation increase in bilateral import 
growth does not yield statistically significant estimates for a change in the likelihood of a country 
implementing antidumping tariffs and that a one standard deviation increase in a measure of 
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variance of import growth yields a positive and significant increase in the probability of an 
antidumping tariff. These results hold when considering countervailing duties or safeguards in 
addition to antidumping tariffs, and for all fixed effects at the HS-04 and HS-06 data level. These 
two results are in contrast to evidence found by Bown and Crowley (2013). A potential explanation 
of the dissimilar results is that we are analyzing a fundamentally different set of countries. Bown 
and Crowley (2013) only consider the U.S.; a large and stable economy, while our country set 
consists of developing economies of varying sizes with volatile trade situations. Thus, there may 
exist such extreme volatility that a country is forced to react with TTB implementation. It is unclear 
that similar results from large and stable economies should be expected for country set with 
fundamentally different import flows.   
Collectively our results yield an intriguing empirical contribution to the literature. The 
implication is that the overwhelming driving force in trade policy setting for Latin American 
countries during this time period was market power. Additionally, TTB implementation is 
augmented when countries have products bound by the WTO, suggesting tariff water plays an 
important role in trade policy setting among Latin American countries. Lastly, our results robustly 
suggest that import growth is not a significant driver of trade policy for our sample set.  
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